Roles and Permissions
Access Control Model
Section titled “Access Control Model”Admin roles
Section titled “Admin roles”Sensitive roles are multisig-based. Admin rotation uses delayed two-step acceptance to prevent hostile takeover via single compromised key.
Role summary
Section titled “Role summary”| Role | Scope | Key Capabilities |
|---|---|---|
| Raise admin | Per-raise | Collateral whitelisting, caps, transferability toggle |
| Strategy admin | Per-wrapper | Configure yield strategy parameters (Aave V3 at launch), deploy and force-withdraw allocations |
| Yield claimer | Per-wrapper | Trigger yield claims and fee distribution |
| Circuit breaker owner | Per-breaker | Configure windows, max draw rates, protected-contract registry |
| Platform admin | Global | Platform fee configuration and parameters |
Admin Procedures
Section titled “Admin Procedures”Admin rotation
Section titled “Admin rotation”- Two-step delayed acceptance model
- New admin is proposed, then must accept after a delay
- Prevents immediate hostile takeover from single key compromise
Pause controls
Section titled “Pause controls”Admin can pause deposits. Exit rights remain available even when paused. See Circuit Breaker — Pausing for stress-scenario details.
Transferability
Section titled “Transferability”transferable must be explicitly enabled on PutManager via enableTransferable before investors can use exits via withdraw (withdrawFT). This gate allows projects to control when FT claiming becomes available.
Strategy-Layer Controls
Section titled “Strategy-Layer Controls”At the wrapper/strategy layer, control functions include:
- Configure strategy parameters (Aave V3 at launch)
- Deploy and force-withdraw strategy allocations
- Set/rotate yield claimer roles
- Set circuit breaker reference
This allows starting conservatively and adding strategies over time.
Upgradeability
Section titled “Upgradeability”Core contracts are upgradeable with controlled authorization paths. Upgrade risk is mitigated by:
- Multisig authorization requirements
- Delayed execution patterns
- Raise isolation (upgrade to one raise does not affect others)
Trust Assumptions
Section titled “Trust Assumptions”See Guarantees — Trust Assumptions for the full trust model. The table below focuses on admin-specific trust boundaries.
| Component | Trust Model |
|---|---|
| Strategy management | Admin-controlled strategy configuration (Aave V3 at launch) |
| Circuit breaker | Admin-configured rate limits |
| Yield claiming | Permissionless trigger, admin-configured routing |
| Contract upgrades | Multisig-gated with controlled authorization |
Admin key and upgrade risks
Section titled “Admin key and upgrade risks”Mitigations in the design:
- Multisig-admin model
- Delayed admin rotation acceptance
Trust assumptions remain around key management. Compromised or malicious admin flow is mitigated but not eliminated by multisig requirements and delayed rotation.